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Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective
Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence
Michael D. Cicchini

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Prosecutorial misconduct has infected every stage of the criminal
process ranging from the initial charging decision through postconviction proceedings. However, misconduct at the trial stage poses
a unique set of difficulties for individuals accused of crimes, and is
the focus of this Article. Trial misconduct includes, most commonly,
improper opening statements, improper examination of witnesses,
and improper closing arguments.
Trial misconduct is worthy of attention due to its tremendous
negative effect on both the defendant and society more generally.
With regard to the defendant, the misconduct may directly violate
numerous constitutional and other rights. For example, a prosecutor’s closing argument may incorporate factual assertions that are
blatantly false or, even if true, that were never testified to or otherwise
introduced at trial. Such misconduct violates the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial as well as the
1
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. Trial misconduct
also compromises the appearance of a fair trial, which undermines
the integrity of the criminal process and consequently harms society
2
generally.
The current legal framework for dealing with prosecutorial misconduct relies exclusively on judicial discretion. When a prosecutor
commits misconduct, and the defendant requests a mistrial as the
remedy, the trial judge is required to step into the shoes of the jury.
The judge must weigh the evidence and decide whether, in light of
∗

J.D., summa cum laude, Marquette University Law School (1999); C.P.A., Illinois
Board of Examiners (1997); M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School (1994);
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1
See, e.g., Douglass v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
2
See Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy:
Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 958–59 (1998).
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all the evidence against a defendant, the impact of the misconduct
3
was significant enough to warrant the requested mistrial.
This approach is not only flawed on a fundamental level, in that
it transfers the jury’s role to the judge, but also has proven completely
ineffective in its application. Decades of court decisions have proved
that judges will rarely grant a defendant’s request for mistrial no mat4
ter how blatant or harmful the prosecutor’s misconduct. In the rare
case that a mistrial is granted or a conviction is reversed on appeal,
courts nearly always allow prosecutors to retry the defendant, often
5
with a stronger case, in a subsequent trial or trials. This use of judicial discretion consistently permits, and in fact encourages, even the
6
most flagrant forms of prosecutorial misconduct.
This Article proposes eliminating judicial discretion when dealing with prosecutorial misconduct. More specifically, upon a finding
of prosecutorial misconduct and a defendant’s subsequent motion
for a mistrial, the mistrial should be granted without any judicial determination of whether the defendant would be found guilty absent
7
the misconduct. Further, in cases of intentional prosecutorial mis8
conduct, subsequent retrial of the defendant should be barred.
This proposal is supported by analogy to recent case law in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court eliminated the use of judicial discretion in order to protect and ensure de9
Before the
fendants’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
10
recent Supreme Court case of Crawford v. Washington, when a prosecutor would offer hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant at
trial, the trial judge was required to use a judicial balancing test to determine whether that hearsay was reliable, and consequently, admis11
sible. After decades of watching lower courts find reliability in even
12
“testimonial hearsay” —the type of hearsay with the most “potential

3

E.g., State v. Bunch, 529 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (“The trial court
must determine, in light of the whole proceeding, whether the basis for the mistrial
request is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.”).
4
See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 425
(1992).
5
See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 911.
6
See infra Part III.B.1.
7
See infra Part IV.A.
8
See infra Part IV.A.
9
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
10
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
11
Id. at 40 (discussing Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56 (1980)).
12
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
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13

for prosecutorial abuse” —the Court in Crawford finally ended the
use of judicial discretion. Instead, Crawford now requires testing the
reliability of hearsay evidence through cross-examination in front of a
14
jury, as the Framers of the Confrontation Clause intended.
The pre-Crawford problem of admitting testimonial hearsay is
closely analogous in every significant way to the problem of dealing
15
with prosecutorial misconduct at trial. In each situation, the defendant’s constitutional rights are compromised due to the potential for
prosecutorial abuse or, in the case of prosecutorial misconduct, actual prosecutorial abuse. In each situation, the function of weighing
evidence and evaluating its credibility and reliability has been improperly taken from the jury and transferred to the judge. In each
situation, decades of court decisions prove that the use of judicial discretion has completely failed in protecting those basic constitutional
rights. Finally, in each situation, the solution to the problem is the
same: eliminate the use of judicial discretion and require that evidence, free of improper prosecutorial taint, be weighed and evaluated by the jury.
Part II of this Article provides examples of prosecutorial misconduct and discusses the harm caused by the misconduct. Part III
details the existing legal framework for dealing with misconduct, and
also illustrates how the use of judicial discretion is its fundamental
flaw. Part IV proposes a better framework for dealing with prosecutorial misconduct at trial and discusses its rationale and logical support
from Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Part V anticipates and addresses the likely arguments in opposition to the proposed rule and
includes a discussion of alternative curative measures, professional
discipline of prosecutors, and judicial costs and efficiency. Part VI
concludes the Article.
II. UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Developing a framework for dealing with prosecutorial misconduct at trial first requires an understanding of the prosecutor’s role
in the criminal process, what actions constitute prosecutorial misconduct, and the harmful impact of the misconduct.

13
14
15

Id. at 56.
Id. at 67–68.
See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Prosecutor’s Role and Examples of Misconduct
1.

The Problem with “Doing Justice”

In most of the case law and legal commentary addressing prosecutorial misconduct, judges and authors typically discuss the prosecutor’s unique set of responsibilities in the criminal justice system. In
addition to advocating for his client—the state or the federal government—the prosecutor also takes on a second role within the system.
This dual role requires the prosecutor to vigorously advocate on
behalf of the government and to ensure the administration of justice. Therefore, the state prosecutor’s [second] role, as “minister
of justice,” is often referred to as a “quasi-judicial” position. This
quasi-judicial role mandates that the prosecutor be held to a particular standard of behavior commonly alluded to as the “do jus16
tice” standard.

Although this lofty goal of “doing justice” is very noble, it is also
very vague and impractical. Additionally, acting as “minister of justice” will, in some cases, directly conflict with the prosecutor’s role as
advocate. “Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this
direction [as minister of justice] is a matter of debate and varies in
17
different jurisdictions.”
In reality, however, the problem of prosecutorial misconduct is
much clearer. Prosecutors rarely, if ever, commit misconduct by failing to live up to some lofty, vague standard. Instead, prosecutors
commit misconduct by violating “well-established” trial rules—rules
set forth in case law, statutes, ethical codes, and court orders—many
of which apply equally to both the prosecutor and the defense coun18
sel. As the Supreme Court of New Mexico noted, “[r]are are the instances of misconduct that are not violations of rules that every legal
professional, no matter how inexperienced, is charged with know19
ing.”
In light of this practical reality, any discussion of an idealistic,
dual role of the prosecutor is not only unnecessary, but also counterproductive. Such a discussion merely detracts from the real issue of
16
Tara J. Tobin, Note, Miscarriage of Justice During Closing Arguments by an Overzealous Prosecutor and a Timid Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. REV. 186, 206
(2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:3.8.
18
See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 910 (“Regarding the existence of misconduct
itself, the criteria are well-established, as set forth in a number of cases . . . .”).
19
State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC-67, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792, 803.
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dealing with prosecutors’ blatant, and usually intentional, violations
20
of well-established rules of trial practice. Consequently, this Article
ignores the loftier debate, and instead focuses on the prosecutor’s
role as advocate and the requirement that he act within the bounds
of clear, well-established precedent governing prosecutor behavior.
2.

Examples of Misconduct throughout the Criminal
Process

With this narrower, more practical view of prosecutorial misconduct as the proper focus, identifying misconduct becomes a far more
21
manageable task. Prosecutors commit misconduct at all stages of
the criminal process, including before and after trial. For example,
misconduct occurs as early as the charging decision itself when
prosecutors criminally charge individuals based on improper consid22
erations such as race, gender, or religion. Misconduct also occurs
when, after a prosecutor decides to charge a defendant, charging is
delayed in order to gain an improper advantage or to harass the de23
fendant.
After charges have been filed, prosecutors engage in misconduct
by including false information in the charging document in order to
ensure a finding of probable cause and to keep the defendant in the
24
criminal process.
Prosecutors also use their considerable power,
and nearly unlimited discretion, to retaliate against defendants when
defendants choose to exercise their constitutional rights. Most commonly, this includes bringing more severe charges as punishment
when a defendant demands a jury trial or pursues and wins an ap25
peal.
Misconduct also occurs in other ways prior to trial. For example,
prosecutors may withhold exculpatory or other discoverable evidence
from the defendant in order to increase their chances of winning a
20
See Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets
Brady, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2005) (arguing that, with regard to the
prosecutor’s violation of discovery obligations, “[r]elying on the image of the prosecutor as ‘doing justice’ distracts from finding a real solution to the problem of nondisclosure”).
21
In one sense, identifying prosecutorial misconduct is very difficult in that most
misconduct will never be detected. That which is detected is usually discovered by
chance. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 959. However, assuming that the misconduct
occurs above-board, as it necessarily would at jury trial, identifying what constitutes
misconduct is quite easy when focusing on well-established rules of trial procedure.
22
See, e.g., State v. Kramer, 2001 WI 132, 248 Wis. 2d 1009, 637 N.W.2d 35.
23
See, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984).
24
See, e.g., State v. Mann, 367 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Wis. 1985).
25
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1982).
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26

conviction. In cases resolved by plea agreement, prosecutors may
commit misconduct by breaching the terms of the agreement entered
into with the defendant. Often the prosecutor will breach the terms
covertly by having others do or say that which the prosecutor has
27
promised not to do or say. Even after conviction and sentencing,
there are numerous additional opportunities for prosecutorial mis28
conduct.
3.

Examples of Trial Misconduct

Despite the tremendous harm that can come from the misconduct illustrated above, the focus of this Article is on prosecutorial misconduct at trial. The reason is not that the harm of trial misconduct
is any greater than that of other misconduct—what can be more
harmful than bringing a citizen into the criminal process in the first
place based on materially false information? Rather, this Article’s focus is on trial misconduct because it poses a particular set of difficulties for the defendant and his counsel.
The problem with trial misconduct, unlike misconduct at other
stages of the criminal process, is that although the misconduct itself is
usually well conceived and calculated, its timing prevents defense
counsel from making a reasoned, strategic decision on how to
counter the misconduct. For example, with regard to trial misconduct in Arkansas, one commentator has written:
[I]n making the decision to object to improper argument, defense counsel is forced to make a number of subjective assessments concerning the potential prejudice which may result from
the argument itself, or an adverse ruling on the objection by the
trial court. . . . [C]ounsel is left with little time to consider
whether an objection is appropriate; whether even a favorable ruling is likely to cure prejudice; and whether, in the context of the
evidence developed at trial, relief in the form of mistrial is prefer29
able to continuing to verdict.

26

See Hoeffel, supra note 20, at 1134 .
See, e.g., State v. Howland, 2003 WI App 104, 264 Wis. 2d 279, 663 N.W.2d 340
(holding that when the district attorney agrees, pursuant to plea agreement, to make
no specific sentencing recommendation, and then contacts the Division of Community Corrections multiple times to urge it to change its sentencing recommendation
from probation to imprisonment, the district attorney’s actions constitute an end-run
around, and breach of, the plea agreement).
28
See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171 (2005).
29
J. Thomas Sullivan, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Arkansas
Criminal Trials, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 213, 215 (1998).
27
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Examples of trial misconduct include: striking potential jurors
30
based on race or some other protected classification; referencing
31
inadmissible facts in opening statements; asking improper questions
of witnesses to elicit inadmissible facts or make assertions that are un32
33
true; and making improper closing arguments. Trial misconduct
can also occur outside of the courtroom. For example, prosecutors
have coerced and threatened witnesses to keep them from testifying
34
for the defendant, and have given key government witnesses “extraordinary favors” including “access to drugs, cash, clothing, and
35
other amenities.”
Improper closing arguments, however, are probably the most
common and the most visible form of trial misconduct. This type of
misconduct poses yet an additional problem for defense counsel:
“[I]n most cases, the prosecutor’s final closing argument will be the
36
last words that the . . . jury hears from either attorney.” “Psychology
teaches that . . . the last words a listener hears will also be long remembered. Again, human experience validates this psychological
concept. There is no one among us who does not want to have the
37
last word in an argument.”
Indeed, the potential impact of misconduct in closing arguments is especially high. Furthermore, the means of committing misconduct in closing argument are limited only by a prosecutor’s
imagination, and can range from the blatantly obvious to the subtle
and deceptive. For example, prosecutors have argued that a defendant’s failure to testify is evidence of his guilt, thereby violating his
38
Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial.
A more subtle approach, but also a Fifth Amendment violation, is to argue that the defense did not rebut a particular piece of evidence, when the only way
to do so would have been through the defendant’s testimony when
39
the defendant chose not to testify.
30

See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See, e.g., State v. Tew, 195 N.W.2d 615 (Wis. 1972).
32
See, e.g., Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2000).
33
See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
34
See, e.g., Kitchen v. United States, 227 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Gardner, 238 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001).
35
See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 934 (citing United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239,
244–45 (7th Cir. 1995)).
36
Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2002).
37
LARRY S. POZNER & ROGER J. DODD, CROSS-EXAMINATION: SCIENCE AND
TECHNIQUES 501 (The Michie Company 1993).
38
See, e.g., Griffin, 380 U.S. at 610–11.
39
See, e.g., United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 1996).
31
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Other types of improper closing arguments include: making assertions that are false or, even if true, were not introduced into evi40
dence; diverting jurors’ attention from the evidence by appealing to
41
their fears or self-interest; vouching for the credibility of govern42
43
ment witnesses; disparaging defense counsel or the defendant;
44
45
misstating the law; shifting the burden of proof to the defendant;
46
and appealing to jurors’ racial bias.
B. Misconduct—What’s the Harm?
1.

Harm to the Accused

“Those who have experienced the full thrust of the power of
government when leveled against them know that the only protection
47
the citizen has is in the requirement for a fair trial.” Prosecutorial
misconduct compromises, at a minimum, “an aspect of a fair trial
which is implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
48
Amendment by which the States are bound.”
This concept of a fair trial “requires that the procedures used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant comport with
49
fundamental ideas of fair play and justice.” When a prosecutor violates rules of trial conduct—the very things that define fair play—the
right to a fair trial is implicated. While any misconduct compromises
the right, the more flagrant, intentional, and repetitive the misconduct, the greater the resulting harm.
In addition, misconduct violates numerous other constitutional
and statutory rights. For example, if a prosecutor directly or indirectly comments in closing argument on the defendant’s failure to
testify, as described above, the Fifth Amendment right against self50
incrimination is violated. Likewise, when a prosecutor argues that a
40

See, e.g., United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 524 (7th Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1995).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000).
43
See, e.g., United States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
44
See, e.g., Cunningham, 54 F.3d at 300–01.
45
See, e.g., United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2000).
46
See, e.g., Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2000).
47
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 651 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48
Id. at 649.
49
Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process:
There’s More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1299 (internal
citations omitted).
50
See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (finding comments on a defendant’s failure to testify to be improper argument); United States v. Cotnam, 88
41
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defendant charged with drug crimes was able to post bail precisely
because he is a drug dealer, the comment not only affects “the fairness of the verdict,” but also has a “potential effect on the Eighth
51
“By analogy to
Amendment rights of defendants” to post bond.
comments on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right not to testify, such comments are improper because they cut down on a constitutional privilege[,] here the privilege of posting bond once it is
52
set[,] by making its assertion costly.”
Perhaps the most harmful, yet often overlooked, type of prosecutorial misconduct is that which violates a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront his accuser. When a prosecutor states
or argues facts not in evidence, the jury hears and considers this information, yet the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine or
challenge the allegations because no witness was ever called to tes53
tify. This Sixth Amendment violation can occur not only during the
closing argument, but also during the opening statement and during
54
the examination of witnesses.
It is not so much the violation of these rights in the abstract that
is harmful to the defendant. Instead, it is the very real consequences
that the defendant suffers when these rights are violated. Most sig55
nificantly, these consequences include false convictions which in
turn result in “lengthy incarceration, financial ruin, and, in a number
56
of instances, sentences of death.” Even in cases of acquittals, innocent defendants still suffer stress, anxiety, long periods of incarceration, and tremendous financial costs.
2.

Societal Harm Generally

Prosecutorial misconduct harms not only the individual accused
of the crime, but also society more generally. First, “[t]he reversal of
a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses,
F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding indirect comments on a defendant’s failure to testify to be improper argument).
51
United States. v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1978).
52
Id. (internal citations omitted).
53
See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); see also United States v. Brisk, 171
F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that prosecutor committed misconduct when he
argued that the defendant engaged in drug activities in front of his children when no
such evidence was ever presented).
54
See, e.g., State v. Bannister, 2006 WI App 136, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 447, 720
N.W.2d 498 (Fine, J., concurring).
55
See Hoeffel, supra note 20, at 1148 (citing studies that show a large number of
convictions reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct, particularly misconduct involving concealing evidence or presenting false evidence).
56
Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 958.
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courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time,
energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once
57
taken place.” Even more costly than a reversal, when left unchecked
the misconduct undermines the integrity of the system itself, thereby
threatening the equally important appearance of a fair trial.
Beyond the drain on precious resources through wasted trial proceedings and protracted post-trial proceedings in the individual
cases, there is an incalculable cost in damaged integrity [to the
judicial system itself] that may be difficult to repair, and which affects the social fabric in a manner that implicates more wide58
spread consequences.

Simply stated, “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administra59
tion of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Conversely, “[i]ntentional wrongdoing in court by perhaps the most
critical member of the government law enforcement team [the
prosecutor] calls into question the fairness and integrity of the
60
trial.”
III. THE EXISTING LAW AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL FLAW:
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
A. The Three-Step Test
The current law governing prosecutorial misconduct at trial
mandates a three-step analysis. First, when the defendant objects to
the alleged misconduct by the prosecutor, e.g., improper closing argument, the court must make a finding as to whether the prosecu61
The judge implicitly
tor’s actions in fact constitute misconduct.
makes this finding by either sustaining or overruling the defendant’s
objection. This step of the analysis is usually not a problem and is not
the subject of much debate. Courts are quite capable of identifying
improper conduct and are usually willing to sustain objections,
62
thereby finding that the misconduct occurred.
57
Fisher, supra note 49, at 1301 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66,
72 (1986)).
58
Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 958.
59
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
60
Paul J. Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent
in Appellate Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 131 (1999).
61
See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 529 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
62
E.g., Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2000) (“During the course
of proceedings, the prosecutor made a variety of inappropriate remarks . . . . Howard objected to each of these and, in all cases, the trial judge sustained the objection
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Second, after finding that the prosecutor committed the mis63
conduct, the trial court must decide the proper remedy. Assuming
the defendant requests a curative instruction and the court grants the
request, the problem is resolved and the trial moves on. However,
when the defendant requests a mistrial, “[t]he trial court must determine, in light of the whole proceeding, whether the basis for the
64
mistrial request is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.”
Under this standard, the trial court is required to step into the
shoes of the jury, weigh the evidence and, if the court believes the defendant would be found guilty even without the misconduct, not
65
grant the mistrial as a remedy. This requires a tremendous amount
of judicial discretion, including the analysis of “mannerisms, expressions, and demeanor of the parties in determining whether to grant a
66
mistrial.” If the defendant is convicted and subsequently appeals
the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial, the appellate court engages
in essentially the same analysis, and often will simply defer to the trial
67
court’s decision.
Third, in the rare case that a mistrial is granted, or a conviction
is reversed on appeal, the trial court must later decide whether retrial
68
of the defendant is barred by double jeopardy protections. Under
current federal law and most state law, double jeopardy protection
only attaches when the court finds that the prosecutorial misconduct
69
“was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.”
Even if the court determines that the prosecutor committed the mis-

. . . .”); see also Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 910 (“Regarding the existence of misconduct itself, the criteria are well-established, as set forth in a number of cases . . . .”).
But cf. State v. Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR (Wis. Ct. App. May 17, 2006) (on file with
author) (overruling the defendant’s objection to the prosecutor introducing facts
not in evidence and shifting the burden of proof to the defendant).
63
See, e.g., Bunch, 529 N.W.2d at 925.
64
Id.
65
See, e.g., Howard, 225 F.3d at 793 (weighing testimony of witnesses and holding
that the prosecutor’s misconduct “did not go to the heart of the prosecution’s case”);
United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing the trial
judge’s duty to determine the impact of the improper conduct); United States v.
Steward, 977 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d
1067 (8th Cir. 2000) (same).
66
Sullivan, supra note 29, at 257 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
67
See, e.g., Bunch, 529 N.W.2d at 925 (“The decision whether to grant a motion
for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court” to which the appellate court will give “great deference.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Haar, 931
F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing the great level of deference afforded to the
trial judge’s ruling).
68
See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
69
Id. at 679.
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conduct with the intent to “prevail at trial by impermissible means”
rather than provoke a request for mistrial, the defendant is offered
70
no double jeopardy protection and may be retried.
B. The Problem with Judicial Discretion
The use of judicial discretion, at both the trial and appellate
level, to deal with prosecutorial misconduct is a fundamentally flawed
concept. It essentially transfers the jury’s role to the judge, and allows the judge to make a finding of guilt by hypothetically weighing
the evidence as though the misconduct had not occurred. That judicial finding of guilt is then used as the basis to hold that the misconduct does not warrant a new trial.
“[S]trong evidence of guilt [as determined by the judge] eliminates any lingering doubt that the prosecutor’s remarks unfairly
71
prejudiced the jury’s deliberations.” Consequently, if the defendant
is “obviously guilty” in the eyes of the judge, he is therefore not enti72
tled to a fair trial untainted by prosecutorial abuse. “The absurdity
73
of this rationale begs for a better solution.”
Aside from being fundamentally flawed on the most basic level,
the existing framework for dealing with prosecutorial misconduct is
difficult, if not impossible, to apply with any level of accuracy or consistency. Judges weigh the evidence and attach varying levels of significance to each piece of evidence, but “no court knows what influ74
enced a particular jury’s verdict of guilt in any particular case.” This
judicial determination of guilt, even if done in good faith, is nothing
more than guesswork for what the jury would have done. In fact, several authors point to “sufficient empirical data to support an assertion that judges do a poor job of evaluating the importance jurors at75
tach to specific issues and evidence.”

70
Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 936. The absurdity of this rule is also addressed infra Part III.B.3.
71
Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 431–32 (7th Cir. 1991)).
72
Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (citations omitted).
73
Tobin, supra note 16, at 235.
74
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 647 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
75
Robert L. Gernon, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Kansas: Still Hazy After All These
Years, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 245, 252 (2002)(citing Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)).

CICCHINIFINAL

2007]

1/15/2007 12:08:01 PM

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

347

Even more problematic, judges actually refuse to exercise their
76
discretion in good faith, and instead engage in “judicial hypocrisy”
by, on the one hand, condemning the misconduct and acknowledging its harm, and on the other hand, doing nothing to protect the
77
very rights that have been violated. In even the most extreme cases
of prosecutorial misconduct, judges consistently find that the misconduct could not possibly have influenced the jury’s decision, and
78
therefore refuse to grant mistrials. The use of judicial discretion
has become nothing more than a “judicial weapon to preserve convictions” as courts routinely dispense with the problem by finding “that
79
This judicial finding of guilt, in
the defendant is clearly guilty.”
turn, is used as the basis to label the misconduct as harmless and allow it to stand.
Finally, in the rare case that mistrial is granted or a conviction is
reversed due to a prosecutor’s misconduct, the use of judicial discretion virtually guarantees the prosecutor the opportunity for successive
prosecutions of the accused. This results from the courts’ willingness
to repeatedly find that the misconduct was merely intended to win a
conviction by improper means, rather than intended to provoke a
mistrial. This is clearly a distinction without a meaningful difference
and, as a practical matter, is a distinction that is impossible to draw.
Yet it is this very distinction that is used to reward the government
with the opportunity for successive prosecutions.
1.

The Courts’ Refusal to Ensure a Fair Trial

The first issue that must be decided by the trial court, and later
by the appellate court upon review, is whether the prosecutor’s misconduct warrants a new trial for the defendant. The trial court, with
the desire to avoid a second trial, and in light of what is often a “very

76

Interview with Terry W. Rose, Attorney, in Kenosha, Wis. (May 26, 2006).
See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s opinion, however, reveals a Court willing to tolerate not only imperfection
but a level of fairness and reliability so low it should make conscientious prosecutors
cringe.”).
78
See id. at 192 (allowing the prosecutor to employ a “relentless and singleminded attempt to inflame the jury,” including the expression of personal beliefs,
commenting on the credibility of witnesses, arguing that the only way to prevent future crime is to impose the death penalty, calling the defendant “an animal,” and
stating that someone should have “blown [the defendant’s] head off”); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,
155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); State v. Smith, 1999 SD 83, 599 N.W.2d 344; State v.
Jackson, 2005 WI App 176, 285 Wis. 2d 804, 701 N.W.2d 652.,
79
Gershman, supra note 4, at 425.
77

CICCHINIFINAL

348

1/15/2007 12:08:01 PM

[Vol. 37:335

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
80

close and ongoing relationship” with the prosecutor, weighs the evidence and nearly always finds that the misconduct would not have affected the outcome of the trial. Then, upon appellate review, this
same “approach allows the appellate court to act as fact-finder and
disregard prosecutorial errors because of its own belief in the defen81
dant’s guilt.” Often, the appellate court refuses to even make such a
82
determination and simply defers to the trial court’s ruling.
This current system has the propensity to permit, and in fact encourage, even the most flagrant cases of prosecutorial misconduct.
Upon finding misconduct, “at best, judges offer condemnation for
83
the arguments and admonishment of the prosecutors,” without providing any effective deterrent for future misconduct or any protection
for the defendant’s rights. The courts’ admonitions, at best, ring hollow, and at worst, have the perverse effect of encouraging prosecutors
to commit further acts of misconduct. As one California court acknowledged:
This court has had occasion to twice address at length [the prosecutor’s] attitude toward, and treatment of, the judge, opposing
counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors and others in the courtroom . . . .
Consequently, it is disheartening, to say the least, to learn that
she takes “pride” in our admonitions, apparently because we did
not reverse the judgment rendered. We most earnestly urge
counsel to reconsider her approach lest in the future it becomes
84
necessary for us to reverse otherwise sustainable convictions . . . .

This particular court’s admonition illustrates that “[t]here is little doubt that prosecutors [commit the misconduct] with full knowledge that they are committing a constitutional violation . . . despite
85
repeated criticism by the appellate courts.”

80

Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 912.
Brian C. Duffy, Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se Reversible-Error
Rule for Prosecutors’ Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1351 (1997).
82
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 742 S.W.2d 932, 935–36 (Ark. 1988) (“It is a serious
matter when an attorney attempts to appeal to the prejudice of the jury by arguing
matters outside of the record. However, we usually defer to the trial court in the exercise of discretion in such matters.”).
83
Duffy, supra note 81, at 1344–45 (citations omitted).
84
Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (citing People v. Congious, No. B0202709
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987)).
85
Gershman, supra note 4, at 429.
81
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An Intra-Court Illustration

The ineffectiveness of judicial discretion, as well as the outright
“judicial hypocrisy” evident in these decisions, is highlighted even
further when looking within a single state and, even more narrowly,
within a single appellate district within that state. In contrast to looking across jurisdictions, this intra-court view better illustrates the
prosecutors’ willingness to continually ignore the law, as well as the
courts’ continued tolerance and even encouragement of that behavior. This phenomenon can be seen within any state and any appellate district, such as the California example, above. Another excellent illustration is Wisconsin’s second district appellate court and a
string of its recent cases.
(a) State v. Jackson: An Empty Warning to Prosecutors
86

In State v. Jackson the defendant was convicted of four counts
based on a sole act of alleged criminal recklessness. On appeal, the
court agreed with the trial court that the prosecutor committed misconduct on multiple occasions throughout trial, from opening state87
ment to closing argument. The prosecutor’s misconduct included
expressing a personal belief about the evidence, vouching for witnesses, disparaging defense counsel, and attempting to shift the bur88
den of proof from the state to the defendant. Just one of the numerous violations was the prosecutor’s argument to the jury that “my
job is to tell you what the truth is [and] present all of the witnesses to
you. . . . [Defense counsel’s] job is to try to get your attention focused somewhere else, use innuendo, try to make you speculate. Her
89
job is to try and get the guy off. That’s it.”
The appellate court analyzed the prosecutor’s numerous acts of
misconduct by stepping into the shoes of the jury and weighing the
evidence. This evidence, in its entirety, consisted only of three eye90
witnesses. First, even prosecutors have long acknowledged that eyewitness testimony is highly suspect and frequently leads to false con91
victions. Second, the eyewitnesses in this case actually contradicted
86

2005 WI App 176, ¶ 1, 285 Wis. 2d 804, ¶ 1, 701 N.W.2d 652, ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶¶ 13–17.
88
Id. at ¶¶ 8–13.
89
Id. at ¶ 9.
90
Id. at ¶ 14.
91
The Wisconsin Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification, coauthored by the Office of the Attorney General and the Wisconsin Department of
Justice, states that “[r]esearch and nationwide experience have demonstrated that
eyewitness evidence can be a particularly fragile type of evidence, and that eyewitnesses can be mistaken” and “can make significant identification errors . . . .” OFFICE
87

CICCHINIFINAL

350

1/15/2007 12:08:01 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:335

each other and had serious credibility issues. Of the three eyewitnesses, one testified that the perpetrator’s description did not match
92
that of the defendant. Another who did identify the defendant admitted to receiving substantial consideration from the district attorney’s office, on five of his own pending cases, in exchange for his tes93
timony. At least one of the witnesses who identified the defendant
was also a convicted criminal and was impeached with the prior con94
victions.
Given the highly speculative and contradictory nature of the evidence, it is difficult to imagine how the prosecutor’s misconduct
could not have harmed the defendant. Additionally, given the numerous violations that occurred from the beginning of the trial
through closing arguments, it is difficult to imagine how the prosecutor could have done any more to violate the defendant’s Due Process
right to a fair trial. In fact, the court stated that:
Disparaging remarks directed at defense counsel are reprehensible. Such remarks can prejudice the defendant by directing the
jury’s attention away from the legal issues or by inducing the jury
to give greater weight to the government’s view of the case. Disparaging remarks that suggest that defense counsel has lied to or
withheld information from the jury can further prejudice the defendant by causing the jury to believe that the defense’s characterization of the evidence should not be trusted and, therefore,
that a finding of not guilty would be in conflict with the true facts
of the case. This kind of statement, if inflammatory in nature,
95
might also detract from the dignity of judicial proceedings.
96

Despite this condemnation, the court, acting as “super-jury,”
weighed the evidence and somehow concluded that “it is not reasonably likely that the prosecutor’s misconduct affected the outcome
97
of the trial, precluded a fair trial or prejudiced [the defendant].”
The court then sternly warned that “such conduct nevertheless reflects very poorly on the office of the district attorney . . . and demeans the trial process. At some point in the future, this type of

OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. & THE WIS. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 2 (2005).
92
93
94
95
96
97

WISCONSIN MODEL POLICY &

Jackson, 2005 WI App 176, at ¶ 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 9 n.2 (citing U.S. v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Gershman, supra note 4, at 425.
Id. at ¶ 16.
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conduct may very well be grounds for a determination of prejudice
98
and reversal of a conviction.”
This case is a perfect illustration of the complete ineffectiveness
of judicial discretion in ensuring a defendant’s Due Process right to a
fair trial. Unfortunately, there is nothing unique about this holding;
judges routinely permit this level of misconduct in other appellate
districts within the state, as well as in other states and in the federal
99
system. What is enlightening, however, is a continued analysis of
case law within this appellate district, especially in view of the court’s
warning that this type of behavior will not be tolerated in the future.
(b)

State v. Mayo: Saved by the Jury Instruction

A short time after Jackson, this same court again had the oppor100
tunity to review a case of prosecutorial misconduct. In State v. Mayo
the very same prosecutor’s office as in Jackson committed nearly identical prosecutorial misconduct, which again included improper closing argument. The prosecutor’s comments to the jury mirrored
those of the prosecutor in Jackson: “[T]he defense attorney here . . .
has one job. His job is to get his client off the hook. That’s his only
job here, not to see justice done but to see that his client is acquitted,
101
and he’s fighting hard for his client.”
The prosecutor was seemingly undeterred by the court’s recent
but apparently empty warning that “[a]t some point in the future,
this type of conduct may very well be grounds for a determination of
102
Consequently, the same
prejudice and reversal of a conviction.”
prosecutor’s office was again rewarded for ignoring the ethical rules
and the rules of trial practice. In Mayo, instead of enforcing its stern
warning enunciated in Jackson, the court pointed to a jury instruction
given by the trial court that stated “closing arguments do not consti103
tute evidence.”
The court concluded that “juries are presumed to
104
follow the instructions given to them,” and consequently found the
misconduct to be harmless.
The court’s reasoning, however, is seriously flawed. First, the
jury instruction referred to by the court was not a curative instruction
tailored to the specific misconduct, but rather was an instruction that
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Id. at ¶ 17.
See, e.g., supra notes 73–74.
2006 WI App 78, ¶ 5 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 276, ¶ 5, 713 N.W.2d 191, ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Jackson, 2005 WI App 176 at ¶ 17.
Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, at ¶ 5.
Id.
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105

is “given in every case.”
By the court’s reasoning, then, the prosecutor may commit misconduct in closing arguments in every case, because the jury has been instructed that closing arguments are not evidence.
Second, the jury instruction is irrelevant. The issue was not the
introduction of improper evidence, but rather the impact of improper
argument. The court’s failure to recognize this distinction proves its
inability and unwillingness to protect defendants’ rights. Instead, the
court merely repeated its same empty warning that “the remarks are
nevertheless deserving of condemnation. . . . [T]he remarks disparaged defense counsel and cast defense counsel, an equal participant
106
in the proceeding, in a pejorative light.”
Furthermore, the court
stated that “[t]he remarks reflect poorly on the prosecutor [and]
107
[t]he remarks cannot be excused, as the State would have us do.”
Not only has the court shown its unwillingness to exercise its discretion in such a way as to protect constitutional rights, but it has also
hypocritically uttered the same useless words that have already been
ignored by the very same prosecutor’s office. While this condemnation may satisfy the court, it only gives the prosecutor’s office more
108
incentive to continue its misconduct in the future.
More importantly, it does nothing for the defendant whose rights have just been
violated by the prosecutor under the court’s wandering eye.
(c)

State v. Graham: The “Failure to Object”

When this particular court grows tired, or possibly embarrassed,
of issuing its boiler-plate warning, it will find ways to side-step the issue of prosecutorial misconduct altogether. For example, in State v.
109
Graham the defendant appealed his conviction based on improper
questions and argument by the prosecutor. One of the key issues at
trial was Graham’s whereabouts on the date of his alleged “other
110
111
This “other act” was very
act” that was introduced as evidence.
similar to the crime with which he was charged and, as the court ac105

See WIS. J.I. CRIMINAL 1, 160 (1999).
Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, at ¶ 12.
107
Id.
108
See Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (citing People v. Congious, No. B0202709
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (“[I]t is disheartening, to say the least, to learn that she
takes ‘pride’ in our admonitions, apparently because we did not reverse the judgment rendered.”)).
109
2006 WI App 214, ¶ 1, 287 Wis. 2d 509, ¶ 1, 704 N.W.2d 425, ¶ 1.
110
See WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2) (2003–04) (permitting, under certain circumstances,
the admission into evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts”).
111
Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶¶ 4, 5.
106
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knowledged, was “highly probative . . . of Graham’s identity as the of112
fender in this case.”
Graham presented evidence, through a witness’s testimony and
through his own testimony, that he was at the Luxor Hotel in Las Ve113
gas at the time of the alleged “other act.” On cross-examination of
Graham’s witness, the prosecutor attempted to undermine Graham’s
114
evidence by stating that “[w]e checked with the Luxor, and—.” Defense counsel immediately interrupted and objected to this as “testimony” by the prosecutor, but the trial court refused to rule on the
115
objection and allowed the prosecutor to continue along this path.
Next, Graham himself testified that he was at the Luxor at the
time of the alleged “other act,” and on cross-examination the prosecutor asked twice: “[y]ou don’t have any explanation as to why the
Luxor would have no record of your ever staying at the Luxor Ho116
tel?”
Defense counsel objected to both questions as providing
117
During
prosecutorial “testimony,” but was overruled both times.
closing argument, having succeeded with this testimonial tactic in
cross-examination, the prosecutor further bolstered his case by telling
the jury that “I was able to have members of my staff telephone the
118
Luxor.”
On appeal, the court acknowledged that the transcript was “devoid of any factual predicate for the prosecutor’s questions . . . re119
garding the records of the Luxor.” The court found that the prosecutor had clearly made assertions that were impossible for the
defendant to cross-examine, and also argued facts not in evidence in
120
his closing argument. However, instead of following through on its
warning that such conduct “may very well be grounds for a determi121
nation of prejudice and reversal of a conviction,” the court insulated the prosecutor from responsibility and actually cast the blame,
in part, on defense counsel.

112

Id. at ¶ 27.
Id. at ¶ 6.
114
Id.
115
Id. Defense counsel stated: “Judge, I object. This is testimony. He needs to
call a witness.” Id.
116
Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶ 9.
117
Id. Defense counsel “objected, stating ‘Judge, he [the prosecutor] can’t testify
to these things.’” Id.
118
Id. at ¶ 11.
119
Id. at ¶ 16.
120
Id. at ¶¶ 16–19.
121
Jackson, 2005 WI App 176, at ¶ 17.
113
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With regard to Graham’s witness, it was undisputed that defense
counsel objected the instant the prosecutor began to “testify” during
the state’s cross-examination, and the trial court refused to rule on
122
the objection.
The appellate court held, however, that defense
counsel’s failure to renew the objection upon completion of the
question that contained the prosecutorial “testimony” constituted a
123
“failure to object.”
This holding not only avoids the real issue but is also contrary to
124
well-established trial practice.
First, defense counsel objected im125
Second, defense
mediately upon hearing the improper conduct.
counsel is not required to repeat the same objection, particularly in
such a short period of time, when the court fails to rule on an objec126
Rather, “[i]f there is no ruling, counsel should consider the
tion.
127
objection overruled.”
With regard to Graham’s own testimony, where the trial court
did explicitly overrule the identical objection, the appellate court acknowledged the judicial error, but simply played “super-jury” by
weighing the evidence and finding that the prosecutor’s misconduct
128
This finding was based on the other evidence prewas harmless.
sented at trial against the defendant, in particular, the “other acts”
129
evidence which was “highly probative . . . of Graham’s identity.”
What the court chooses to ignore, however, is that the prosecutor’s
misconduct was employed specifically to prove that the defendant
committed the “other act”—the very piece of evidence on which the
court relies to negate the impact of the misconduct.
(d)

State v. Smith: Moving for Mistrial

In the last of a string of cases, and shortly after Graham, this same
appellate court again had the opportunity to address prosecutorial
130
misconduct in State v. Smith.
In Smith, the defendant objected to
improper closing arguments by the prosecutor but the trial court

122

Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶ 22 (“Thus, the substance of the information, albeit improper, was
known to the jury by virtue of Graham’s failure to object.”).
124
R. GEORGE BURNETT, et al., WISCONSIN TRIAL PRACTICE § 6, at 16 (1st ed. Supp.
2001).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶ 29.
129
Id. at ¶ 27.
130
No. 2005AP1617-CR (Wis. Ct. App. May 17, 2006) (on file with author).
123
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131

overruled each and every objection.
These improper arguments
included offering facts not testified to by witnesses, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, and commenting on defense counsel’s
132
pre-trial strategy as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
Instead of taking the opportunity to review the claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate court again side-stepped the issue altogether and again used defense counsel as the reason for not addressing the underlying problem. This time, the court summarily
133
dismissed the defendant’s appeal, holding that the issue was waived
134
because defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial.
It is true, and this very appellate court has held, that when a defendant objects to prosecutorial misconduct, and the court sustains
the objection and issues a curative instruction, the defendant’s failure
to move for a mistrial must be construed as his choice to take the case
135
to verdict rather than start over with a new trial. The problem with
the appellate court’s application of this rule in Smith, however, is that
in Smith, each and every one of defense counsel’s objections had
136
been overruled by the trial court.
The appellate court’s holding, therefore, violates the incredibly
basic concept that a mistrial, like a curative instruction, is a remedy.
In order to request a remedy, there must be a wrong as evidenced by
a sustained objection. It is contrary to common logic to require the
defendant to request a remedy—whether in the form of a curative instruction, a mistrial, a special rebuttal argument, or some other remedy—when the trial court has just found that no wrong has occurred
and has overruled the defendant’s objection. This concept is so fundamental, both commentators and other state courts, including California, agree that:
If the trial court overrules the objection, no further step should
be required of defense counsel in terms of either the motion for
mistrial or request for specific admonition to disregard precisely
because the trial court has ruled that no misconduct has oc-

131

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
133
See WIS. STAT. § 809.21 (2003–04); Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR, at 1.
134
Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR, at 2.
135
State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, ¶ 30, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 483, ¶ 30,
718 N.W.2d 269, ¶ 30 (“Rockette made no motion for mistrial after the court addressed the objections. All we can assume is that Rockette was satisfied with the
court’s ruling and curative measure, and that he had no further objections. Rockette
took his chances with the jury.”).
136
Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR, at 2.
132
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curred. Consequently, curative action could hardly be rationally con137
templated by a court that has rejected the defense challenge.
[T]he absence of a request for a curative admonition does not
forfeit the issue for appeal if the court immediately overrules an
objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct and as a consequence
138
the defendant has no opportunity to make such a request.

Further, in Smith, the mistrial would have to be requested “immediately after the claimed source of error, especially [because] the
139
error [was] the misconduct of an attorney.”
Defense counsel,
therefore, would have to move for the mistrial immediately after the
trial court overruled the objection, thereby risking admonition by the
court for what would have been an absurd request, and potentially
140
diminishing defense counsel’s credibility in the eyes of the jury.
These cases, which are not only from the same state but also
from the same appellate court within the state, illustrate the courts’
inability to protect defendants’ constitutional rights. Additionally,
these cases show that the courts’ ineffectiveness is not the result of a
failed, but good faith effort. Instead, the ineffectiveness stems from
bad faith rulings and “judicial hypocrisy” in condemning prosecutors
for their harmful misconduct in one breath, and then approving and
even encouraging the very same misconduct in the next. Finally, and
perhaps most harmfully, the absurd rulings in Graham and Smith also
highlight the lengths to which the courts will go to avoid the underlying issues of prosecutorial misconduct and the abuse of trial court
discretion in dealing with the misconduct.
3.

The Courts’ Refusal to Bar Retrial

Another problem with the application of judicial discretion is
that, in the rare case that a mistrial is actually granted or a conviction
is reversed, courts almost universally allow the prosecution to retry
the defendant, often with a stronger, trial-tested case the second time
around.

137

Sullivan, supra note 29, at 256 (emphasis added).
People v. Najera, No. E034255, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 5712, at *16 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 16, 2004) (citing People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 820–21 (Cal. 1998)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
139
BURNETT et. al., supra note 124, at 22.
140
Failure to immediately move for the mistrial after the overruled objection
would likely have given the appellate court another reason to summarily dismiss the
defendant’s claim. The court could then have held that anything other than an immediate motion for mistrial would have denied the trial court the opportunity to attempt to cure the misconduct by less severe means. See id.
138
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141

Under Oregon v. Kennedy, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the defendants’ double jeopardy protections only extend to cases where the prosecutor’s misconduct was committed “in
142
order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.”
Therefore, upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss a second prosecution, the
court must again exercise its discretion and make a finding of fact.
This time, the court must make the distinction between whether the
prosecutor committed the misconduct “in order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial,” or rather merely to engage in “har143
assment or overreaching.”
Under Kennedy, therefore, if the prosecutor merely intended to
harass the defendant, overreach, or obtain a conviction by improper
means, the prosecutor is rewarded by being able to retry the defendant in a second trial or even in subsequent trials. The problem for
the defendant is as obvious as it is ridiculous. “It is almost inconceivable that a defendant could prove that the prosecutor’s deliberate
misconduct was motivated by an intent to provoke a mistrial instead
144
of an intent simply to prejudice the defendant.”
Not surprisingly,
few courts have actually barred retrial under this incredible stan145
dard.
IV.

REMOVING JUDICIAL DISCRETION FROM THE FRAMEWORK

A. Proposed Rule and Rationale
The solution to this problem is that once the trial court finds
that the prosecutor committed misconduct, judicial discretion must
be eliminated in determining the proper remedy. If the defendant
requests a mistrial based on the misconduct, the mistrial should be
granted regardless of the judge’s opinion about whether the defen146
dant would be found guilty had the misconduct not occurred.
This proposed rule will ensure a fair trial, free of prosecutorial
abuse and manipulation of the trial process. This fairness is ensured
141

456 U.S. 667 (1982).
Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)).
143
Id. at 675.
144
Id. at 688 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
145
See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 894–95.
146
See Duffy, supra note 81, at 1360 (arguing for a per-se reversible error rule in
cases of religious arguments at sentencing hearings in capital cases); see also Tobin,
supra note 16, at 237 (arguing for automatic reversal upon a finding of prosecutorial
misconduct in closing arguments); see also White, supra note 36, at 1157–68 (arguing
for a per-se reversal rule in capital cases not only to protect rights but also to regulate
prosecutorial conduct).
142
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because the jury, not the judge, will be weighing the evidence and
147
Furthermore, in cases where a prosecutor
making findings of fact.
believes he has a strong case, the rule will discourage misconduct because the prosecutor will not wish to risk a mistrial when he believes
148
he will likely win a conviction.
Second, upon declaration of a mistrial, the state should be
barred from retrying the defendant upon a finding that the prosecutor’s misconduct was intentional. This should not require a finding
that the prosecutor intended to “goad the defendant into seeking a
149
mistrial,” but rather merely that he intended the conduct itself, and
150
This
knew or should have known that the conduct was improper.
finding would be made on an objective basis, and would necessarily
include all violations of well-established trial rules and procedures.
This aspect of the proposed rule would offer legitimate, rather
than illusory, double jeopardy protection by prohibiting successive
prosecutions for the same allegations. Furthermore, in cases where a
prosecutor believes he has a weak case, this rule will discourage misconduct because the prosecutor would rather take his chance with
the jury’s verdict than guarantee a mistrial and be barred from re151
prosecuting the defendant.
B. The Confrontation Clause Analogy
The rule proposed in this Article for dealing with prosecutorial
misconduct is not unique in the larger realm of constitutional jurisprudence. When the use of judicial discretion fails to protect constitutional rights, that judicial discretion has been taken away to ensure
that those rights are in fact protected. This principle has most re147

Gernon, supra note 75, at 252 (discussing Kansas case law and the view “that it
is problematic to allow appellate judges to draw conclusions as to ‘a defendant’s guilt
based on [the judge’s] own view[] of the weight and credibility of the evidence.’”)
(quoting Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 79, 127 (1988)).
148
See Gershman, supra note 4, at 431.
149
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982) (quoting United States v. Dinitz,
424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)).
150
Numerous states have already abandoned the illusory double jeopardy protection of Oregon v. Kennedy, and have instead adopted more sensible tests offering realistic double jeopardy protection to defendants. See, e.g., State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC67, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 (requiring that the prosecutor act in “willful
disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal”); see also State v. Kennedy, 666
P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983) (requiring only that the prosecutor “intends or is indifferent to the resulting mistrial or reversal”); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 615
A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (requiring that the prosecutor intended to “prejudice the
defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial”).
151
See Gershman, supra note 4, at 431.
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cently been expounded in Crawford v. Washington, where the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the admission of hearsay
evidence and the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
In Crawford, the Court revisited the decades-old practice of allowing hearsay evidence to be introduced at trial, against a defendant,
without affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the decla153
Pre-Crawford, the prosecutor was allowed to introduce such
rant.
hearsay, despite the plain language of the Confrontation Clause, pro154
vided the trial judge first found the hearsay to be “reliable.”
Reliability was determined through the use of a judicial balancing test by
weighing the facts and circumstances surrounding the hearsay state155
ment.
The problem with this approach was that the use of judicial discretion failed miserably in protecting the defendant from even the
156
most flagrant violations of the Confrontation Clause. Judges would
consistently admit into evidence even the most harmful and unreliable hearsay that had the “unique potential for prosecutorial
157
For example, courts would routinely find to be reliable,
abuse.”
and consequently admissible, hearsay statements of third parties that
implicated the defendant but were obtained through police interrogations of those third parties. Although this type of ex parte govern158
ment interrogation was the “principal evil” at which the Confrontation Clause was directed, the use of judicial discretion served to water
down the Clause to the point where it provided no protection what159
soever.
After decades of watching the judges abuse their discretion, the
Supreme Court finally ruled that “[a]dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confronta160
Furthermore, allowing judicial discretion to replace “catetion.”
161
gorical constitutional guarantees”
amounts to a denial of
152

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
See id. at 38.
154
Id.
155
See id. at 41.
156
See id. at 63–64.
157
Id. at 56.
158
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
159
See id. at 65 (“To add insult to injury, some of the courts that admit untested
testimonial statements find reliability in the very factors that make the statements testimonial.”).
160
Id. at 61.
161
Id. at 67.
153
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constitutional rights.
“Vague standards are manipulable,” and
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is [deemed reliable by a judge] is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defen164
dant is obviously guilty.”
The Crawford Court therefore held that with regard to untested,
testimonial hearsay offered by the state against a defendant, the hearsay must be, or must have been at a previous time, subjected to cross165
Without the opportunity for actual
examination by the defendant.
166
cross-examination, the hearsay must be excluded from evidence.
The pre-Crawford hearsay problem described above directly parallels today’s prosecutorial misconduct problem, and so too should
167
the solutions.
First, whether by admitting untested, testimonial
hearsay against a defendant, or by allowing a prosecutor to commit
repeated acts of misconduct throughout trial, courts are violating defendants’ constitutional rights. Furthermore, the precise constitutional right being violated is often the same.
For example, many forms of prosecutorial misconduct violate
not only the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial,
but also the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation specifically addressed in Crawford. “A prosecutor’s use of non-evidence (such as assertions in an opening statement or, under some circumstances,
questions) to sway a jury, can deny a defendant his or her right to
confrontation when those assertions are not backed by evidence pro168
It does not matter that the prosecutor’s statements
duced at trial.”
169
are “not technically testimony.”
The reality is that the statements
are “the equivalent in the jury’s eyes, thus triggering the right to con170
front.”
Second, in both the pre-Crawford hearsay problem as well as today’s prosecutorial misconduct problem, the use of judicial discretion
is a fundamentally flawed concept in that judges are allowed to usurp
the role of the jury. In the pre-Crawford setting, judges were allowed
162

See id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
164
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
165
Id. at 61.
166
Id. at 68.
167
Cross-Amendment analogies are not uncommon. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978) (drawing an analogy between Fifth and Eight
Amendments as affected by prosecutorial misconduct).
168
State v. Bannister, 2006 WI App 136, ¶ 20, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 447, ¶ 20,
720 N.W.2d 498, ¶ 20 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1965)).
169
Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1965)).
170
Id. at 21–22 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1965)).
163
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to determine the reliability, and consequently admissibility, of hear171
In cases of prosecutorial misconduct, judges go even
say evidence.
further and act as “super-jury” to determine the guilt of the defendant, and consequently use this finding to deny the defendant his
172
right to a trial free of prosecutorial abuse.
This use of judicial discretion is fundamentally flawed because
our concept of justice depends not only on the final outcome—e.g.,
whether the hearsay is reliable or whether the defendant is guilty—
but also on the process used to determine that outcome. Because the
way in which we reach the result is just as important as the result itself, it is unacceptable to let the judge usurp the jury’s role. This is
true whether the judge is determining the reliability of hearsay,
thereby compromising confrontation rights, or determining a defendant’s guilt, which will in turn be used to condone the prosecutorial
misconduct and compromise the right to a fair trial.
For example, with regard to the pre-Crawford rule of admitting
testimonial hearsay without cross-examination, the Court stated:
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally
at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus
reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about
173
how reliability can best be determined.

Likewise, permitting prosecutorial misconduct to stand because
a judge has independently determined the defendant’s guilt poses
the identical problem:
Due process is thus a set of fair procedures designed to determine
truth in a manner consistent with the process goals of the system.
Due process requires not only that criminal proceedings reach a
correct outcome—that justice be done—but also that the correct
outcome be reached only through the use of fundamentally fair
174
“[T]he question is not whether guilt may be spelt
procedures.
out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a jury ac-

171

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
Gershman, supra note 4, at 425.
173
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added).
174
Fisher, supra note 49, at 1300 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137
(1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting)).
172
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cording to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal
175
trials.”

Third, prosecutorial misconduct is equally, if not more, harmful
than Confrontation Clause violations. Pre-Crawford, when judges determined the reliability, and consequently the admissibility, of hearsay evidence, they were guarding against only the possibility of prosecutorial abuse in that the government may have influenced the
176
reliability of the hearsay statement.
In the case of prosecutorial
misconduct at trial, however, prosecutorial abuse is very present and
real, rather than merely a possibility, and has a definite impact on the
jury’s decision-making process and consequently on the defendant’s
177
rights.
Additionally, with regard to judicially determined reliability of
hearsay, the Court in Crawford stated that “[w]e have no doubt that
the courts below were acting in utmost good faith when they found
178
In cases of prosecutorial misconduct, however, courts
reliability.”
have routinely shown a lack of good faith. Instead, courts have acted
hypocritically by repeating the same, empty warning to prosecutors,
and have even gone so far as to divert blame to defense counsel while
insulating prosecutors and trial judges from responsibility.
Fourth, after decades of use, both the pre-Crawford rule for admitting hearsay evidence, as well as today’s rule for dealing with
prosecutorial misconduct have proven completely ineffective in their
application. In cases of determining the reliability of hearsay, the
Court stated that the most serious problem with the pre-Crawford judicial discretion approach was “its demonstrated capacity to admit
core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly
179
meant to exclude.”
Likewise, with regard to using judicial discretion in cases of
prosecutorial misconduct, the courts have continually permitted, and

175

Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S.
607, 614 (1946) (emphasis added)).
176
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 (“Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial
abuse . . . .”) (emphasis added).
177
See Tobin, supra note 16, at 221 (citing empirical studies of the effects on jurors
of improper argument and the failure of so-called curative instructions to cure the
problem).
178
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.
179
Id. at 63.
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in fact encouraged, even the most egregious misconduct that clearly
180
violates the Due Process right to a fair trial.
Fifth and finally, the use of judicial discretion under the preCrawford rule for admitting hearsay, as well as under today’s rule for
dealing with prosecutorial misconduct, produces a bizarre and unacceptable result.
In Crawford, the Court acknowledged that
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable [via a judicial determination] is akin to dispensing with jury trial
181
because a defendant is obviously guilty.”
Likewise, with regard to prosecutorial misconduct, under the
current rule the defendant is not entitled to a trial free of prosecutorial abuse as long as the judge believes the defendant would be found
guilty even without the misconduct. Essentially, “if [a defendant] is
obviously guilty as charged, he has no fundamental right to be tried
182
fairly.”
In both situations, just as the problems parallel one another, so
too should the solutions. The use of judicial discretion must be
eliminated, and replaced with what the Framers of the Constitution
intended: a categorical constitutional guarantee to a fair trial in
which the jury, not the judge, determines the weight and credibility
of the evidence and the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
V. CRITIC’S CORNER: ANTICIPATING THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS
A. The Jury Instruction as a Curative Measure
Courts routinely permit prosecutorial misconduct, especially in
closing argument, by relying on the jury instruction as a curative
measure. Most commonly, this is nothing more than an instruction
that closing arguments are not evidence, which is supposed to cure
183
the harm caused by the prosecutor’s highly prejudicial argument.
This supposed attempt to cure the harm, which is actually nothing more than encouragement for the misconduct, is incredibly
180
See, e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (quoting People v. Congious, No.
B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (“[I]t is disheartening, to say the least, to
learn that she takes ‘pride’ in our admonitions, apparently because we did not reverse the judgment rendered.”).
181
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
182
Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (quoting Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of
Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 486 (1959)).
183
See, e.g., State v. Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, ¶ 5, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 276, ¶ 5,
713 N.W.2d 191, ¶ 5 (“[T]he jury was instructed that closing arguments do not constitute evidence, and juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them.”)
(citing State v. Traux, 151 Wis. 2d 354, 362 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)).

CICCHINIFINAL

364

1/15/2007 12:08:01 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:335

flawed on several levels. First, the curative instruction does nothing
to address the problem. It is true that improper argument is not evidence, but it is also true that proper argument is not evidence. Therefore, the instruction, while true, is completely irrelevant. The harm
comes not from whether the improper arguments are evidence, but
rather from their prejudicial effect on the jury.
Second, the instruction is often read to the jury, as it should be,
even in cases where the state makes a closing argument completely
184
within the bounds of the law.
By that logic, then, improper argument should be acceptable in every case because the jury has already
been instructed that it is not evidence. If that were so, rules governing closing argument should simply be eliminated, which would at
least place defense counsel on a level playing field with the prosecutor.
Third, and most significantly, even if a special, tailored instruction were given to address the specific misconduct, it is likely that
such an instruction will only draw more attention to prosecutor’s argument, thereby further harming, rather than helping, the defen185
“‘Curative’ or ‘limiting’ instructions are more problematic
dant.
because the instructions not only fail to cure prejudice, they generally
186
emphasize the objectionable argument.”
This counter-productive effect of the so-called curative instruction is not only intuitively obvious, but is also supported by psycho187
logical research and is recognized by many judges as well. “The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
188
“Indeed, the judge’s cautionary instruction may do more
fiction.”
harm than good: It may emphasize the jury’s awareness of the cen-

184
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 29, at 214 (discussing the standard jury instruction
in Arkansas that “argument does not constitute evidence and the jury is instructed
not to consider it as such . . .”); see also Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, at ¶ 5 (discussing the
mandatory criminal jury instruction in Wisconsin that “closing arguments do not
constitute evidence . . . ”).
185
See Tobin, supra note 16, at 221 (citing several empirical studies to support the
proposition that curative instructions do more harm than good for the defendant).
186
Duffy, supra note 81, at 1354 (internal citations omitted).
187
Tobin, supra note 16, at 221 (citing several articles and scientific studies indicating that jurors are unable to follow curative instructions).
188
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted) (citing Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d
Cir. 1948)).
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sured remark—as in the story, by Mark Twain, of the boy told to
189
stand in the corner and not think of a white elephant.”
Interestingly, the very same judges that are quick to rely on the
curative instruction in criminal cases implicitly admit its complete ineffectiveness by their rulings in civil cases. For example, Judge Frank
observed, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Antonelli Fire190
works Co., how his court members frequently reversed verdicts in
civil cases where the plaintiff’s lawyer made improper comments,
such as telling the jury that the defendant, from whom the plaintiff
191
Judge Frank was rightly critical of this
seeks money, is insured.
double standard, and argued that if reversal “is to be invoked to protect the pocketbook of an insurance company, it should be invoked
in [criminal cases] to protect natural persons from being sent to jail
192
unjustly.”
B. Bad Prosecutor: Prosecutorial Discipline in Disguise
Those opposed to ensuring constitutional protections argue that
rules such as the one proposed in this Article are nothing more than
193
an improper means of disciplining prosecutors. The rule proposed
in this Article, however, is not designed in any way to accomplish
prosecutorial discipline. Rather, its goal is to protect the fundamental rights of citizens accused of crimes, and to ensure “that the circumstances that gave rise to the misconduct won’t be repeated in
194
other cases.”
Implementing an effective system of prosecutorial discipline is,
in itself, a noble goal. Unfortunately, the legal profession has shown
little if any interest in punishing prosecutors for misconduct. “It is
unclear why the electorate, the judiciary, and the legislature have
195
taken such a ‘hands-off’ approach with the American prosecutor.”
Most likely, the answer is the political nature of judges and legislators.
196
Due to the “lack of public outrage over prosecutorial misconduct,”
189

United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 656 (2nd Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
190
See id.
191
See id. at 658.
192
Id. (footnote omitted).
193
See, e.g., Peter G. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies,
77 WASH. U. L. Q. 713, 827 (1999).
194
Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 959 (quoting United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315,
1324 (9th Cir. 1993)).
195
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 464 (2001).
196
Id. at 465.
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as well as the glamorization of the prosecutor in our society, it is little
wonder why prosecutorial discipline is nearly non-existent.
Prosecutors enforce the law against people accused of committing
crimes—an unpopular group in a country with one of the most
punitive approaches to crime in the world. Because law enforcement is such a high priority in this country and the victims of
prosecutorial misconduct are so unpopular, the electorate, legislature, and judiciary may be less concerned with fairness in the
197
prosecutorial process.

In any event, politically motivated or not, those with the power
and authority to punish prosecutors are unwilling to do so. As of
1999, “one of the striking realities of the forty-five recent federal reversals is that despite findings of intentional misconduct and extensive criticism of prosecutors’ conduct, not one court ordered a prose198
cutor disciplined or referred a prosecutor for discipline.”
This
sends the clear message that the courts have no intention of punishing or disciplining the offending prosecutors, despite the huge stakes
that individual citizens face in the criminal process. As one commentator wrote, at least with regard to prosecutorial misconduct by withholding evidence, under the current system:
[T]he prudent prosecutor is unconcerned about an ethical violation. Even assuming the prosecutor is aware of his duty to disclose favorable evidence under the professional codes . . . he has
never heard of a prosecutor being disciplined for his exercise of
discretion in withholding evidence. . . . The message sent is that,
although it is a rule on the books, the disciplinary authorities do
199
not believe its violation worthy of condemnation.

Another reason that so few ethical violations are reported to disciplinary bodies is that such a report by the trial court would “ring
200
hollow if curative action had not been taken at trial.”
Yet another
possible reason may again be political in nature. “[A]s a governmental figure of enormous power and prestige, the prosecutor is a person
who professional bar organizations would not wish to alienate,” par201
ticularly “in today’s anti-crime climate.”
While punishing ethical violations may be a worthy goal, the current environment in which we operate makes any such attempt fu-

197
198
199
200
201

Id. at 464 (footnote omitted).
Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 169–70.
Hoeffel, supra note 20, at 1146–47 (footnotes omitted).
Sullivan, supra note 29, at 253.
Gershman, supra note 4, at 445.
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202

tile.
Therefore, rather than pleading with prosecutors to abide by
203
ethical rules, a better approach is simply to eliminate any advantage
gained by the misconduct.
Under the existing framework, if a prosecutor has a strong case,
204
the misconduct will only make it stronger. There is virtually no risk
of reversal because the trial court and reviewing court will simply find
that, given the strength of the State’s case, the defendant would have
been found guilty even without the misconduct, and therefore denying him a new trial will not prejudice him. If, on the other hand, the
prosecutor has a weak case and faces a likely acquittal, the misconduct will once again help the case. In this situation, the misconduct
increases the chance of conviction or, even in the rare case of mistrial
205
or reversal, gives the prosecutor a chance at a new trial.
In either of the above scenarios, the prosecutor has tremendous
incentive to commit misconduct. However, if the advantages gained
by prosecutorial misconduct are removed, as they would be under the
rule proposed in this Article, there would be no incentive for prosecutors to commit misconduct in the first place. This would thereby
reduce or even eliminate the need for disciplinary action.
C. A Word on Judicial Costs and Efficiency
Even the most flagrant cases of prosecutorial misconduct typically result in judicial tolerance, if not judicial encouragement, at the
trial level, followed by affirmation at the appellate level. Proponents
of this status quo frequently justify their position by pointing to the
perceived costs of conducting a second, fair trial, free of the misconduct. Even some of those who are highly critical of prosecutorial
misconduct seem to concede that the current, tolerant approach to
206
dealing with prosecutorial misconduct “saves judicial resources.”
This cost and efficiency argument is flawed in several respects.
First, it overstates the true cost of implementing a less tolerant approach to dealing with misconduct. For example, under a rule like
the one proposed in this Article, not every defendant in every case
202

See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Advocacy in a Time of Uncertainty: Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics: Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously,
8 D.C. L. REV. 275 (2004).
203
See, e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (citing People v. Congious, No.
B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (After multiple cases of misconduct by the
same prosecutor, the court pleaded: “We most earnestly urge counsel to reconsider
her approach . . . .”).
204
See Gershman, supra note 4, at 431.
205
See id.
206
See id.
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would request a mistrial in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. In fact,
prosecutors often commit misconduct because they realize that the
207
Under these circumstances, defense
defendant has a strong case.
counsel will often want to proceed to verdict rather than risk a second trial. “[I]f grounds exist for a mistrial but it appears that the
party harmed by the error will nonetheless prevail, a motion for mis208
trial could be a costly error.”
Second, the cost and efficiency argument also understates, or
even ignores, the immense costs currently being incurred under the
existing three-step framework for dealing with misconduct. With the
great number of cases currently being appealed for misconduct, the
costs of attorneys, judges, transcripts, and other legal expenditures
are exorbitant, but usually unaccounted for in the calculation. Furthermore, until the behavior is curtailed, society will continue to bear
these costs.
Third, the current calculus of the cost and efficiency argument
often ignores the deterrent effect of alternative, stricter approaches
209
to dealing with misconduct. By failing to account for the inevitable
reduction in prosecutorial misconduct and related appeals, the expected litigation costs of the alternative methods are overstated.
Fourth and finally, the cost and efficiency argument ignores
many costs associated with the current system because certain costs
are, although very real, quite difficult to quantify. For example:
[E]ven on its own terms, the proposed calculus in the instance of
prosecutorial misconduct falls short. What cost does corroded integrity in law enforcement’s preeminent office exact vis-à-vis the
moral authority and ultimate viability of the criminal justice system? What message is transmitted in a society which is unwilling
to enforce limits on prosecutor conduct otherwise beyond the
210
reach of the law?

While the very nature of this type of cost puts it beyond the
scope of quantification, it is the significance and impact of this type
of cost that renders a cost-benefit analysis highly ineffective, and
largely irrelevant, when addressing the issue of prosecutorial miscon211
duct.

207

See id.
R. GEORGE BURNETT, WISCONSIN TRIAL PRACTICE § 8, at 22 (1st ed. Supp. 2001).
209
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 49, at 1322 (addressing the goal of “[d]eterring the
[p]rosecutor”).
210
Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 961.
211
See id.
208
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CONCLUSION

Prosecutorial misconduct is wide-spread and has infected every
aspect of the criminal trial. The current legal framework for dealing
with misconduct at trial relies exclusively on the use of judicial discretion to determine the proper remedy, if any, for the misconduct. Essentially, if the trial court, and later the appellate court, believes that
the defendant was guilty as charged, this belief is in turn used to hold
that the prosecutorial misconduct could not, or did not, affect the
jury’s verdict of guilt. The misconduct is therefore allowed to stand,
and the defendant is denied, among other constitutional rights, his
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial. Additionally, the general societal harm, including the damage to the integrity
of the criminal justice system, is immense but immeasurable.
The current system is fundamentally flawed on the most basic
level in that it allows the judge to usurp the role of the jury, weigh the
evidence and make findings of guilt. In addition to its fundamental
flaw, the current system, which relies exclusively on judicial discretion, has proven to be highly ineffective in its application. In fact, the
trial and appellate courts have not only tolerated prosecutorial misconduct, but have actually encouraged it by issuing empty, repetitive
warnings to prosecutors that the courts are unwilling to enforce.
Even worse, courts will often go to extraordinary lengths, including
diverting blame to defense counsel, to avoid dealing with the underlying misconduct. The result is that prosecutorial misconduct, even in
its most flagrant forms, continues to flourish.
The solution to the problem is to eliminate the use of judicial
discretion from the current framework of dealing with trial misconduct. Instead, upon a finding of misconduct, if the defendant requests a remedy of mistrial, a mistrial should be granted regardless of
whether the trial court believes that the defendant would be found
guilty even absent the misconduct. Furthermore, in cases of intentional misconduct—i.e., the prosecutor intended to commit the act
that formed the basis of the misconduct, and knew or should have
known that the act was improper—double jeopardy protections
should bar retrial of the defendant.
This proposal is supported by analogy to recent case law in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, specifically Crawford v. Washington.
Prior to Crawford, in deciding whether a prosecutor could admit hearsay against a defendant at trial, the rule was that the defendant did
not have the right to cross-examine his accuser as long as a trial judge
decided that the hearsay being offered against him was “reliable.”
The Crawford Court held, however, that “[d]ispensing with confronta-
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tion because testimony is obviously reliable [via a judicial determination] is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obvi212
ously guilty.”
Likewise, with regard to prosecutorial misconduct, the current
rule is that a defendant is not entitled to a trial free of prosecutorial
misconduct as long as the trial judge, or later the appellate judge, decided that there was strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt even
without the misconduct. In other words, “if [a defendant] is obviously guilty as charged, he has no fundamental right to be tried
213
fairly.”
In order to preserve this most fundamental constitutional right,
the use of judicial discretion must be replaced with a categorical, uncompromised right to a trial free of prosecutorial manipulation and
abuse.

212

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (quoting Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of
Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 486 (1959)).
213

